Blogging through Dirty Wars, Chapter 12, Anwar Awlaki update

Chapter 12 takes us back to Awlaki’s story, in 2003 beginning in the UK and ending in Yemen. Awlaki was just as successful in Great Britain as he was in the US.  He also was becoming more militant, and he had a very receptive audience.

Scahill does not get into this at all but it is my understanding that Muslims in the UK tend more toward radical ideas. Many dissidents I think (and by dissidents I mean from all ends of the spectrum) from Arab countries wind up there. A long time ago (10  years maybe?) there was an entire Frontline show on Saudi Arabia dissidents.  Personal story, a friend of mine who came from a Muslim family in India described to me how her brother became much more conservative after a stay in Britain. Like most Indian Muslims my friend and her family, while religious, were fairly mild-mannered which probably has to do with the unique history of Muslims in India. Anyway my friend’s brother, an engineer, fell in with a certain crowd, and next thing her family knew he was talking a lot about religion (and how they should change). It actually made marriage arrangements more difficult for because most female Indian Muslims were not down with the full body coverage, walking behind the husband, and no pictures.

Why is this the case? It is my understanding (translation: not claiming any expertise) that the UK society is more exclusionary; in essence there is more racism. For all the problems in the US, it is the rhetoric that everybody is an immigrant (to some extent), everybody has an equal chance, and our diversity is our strength. This is not exactly true of course but it is the mantra. Most white people completely accept it, and I really think many people of color, especially immigrants, buy in to it to some degree.  It’s a strong narrative. Honestly I think you can see evidence of this by the fact that we have not seen a real “home-grown” terror plot by US Muslims. (I’m not counting the ones that the FBI basically made up.)

While Awlaki was careful not to call for actual violence, his words and sermons came very close. The movie “Dirty Wars”, which I saw a few weeks ago focuses a lot on the Awlaki story. A lot of pictures, a local TV (!) clip of his family (the all-American Muslim family) and extensive interview with his father. And his father describes the shift, from the time when Awaki seem to have real faith that he could be a Muslim in America, and personified the American Dream, to the place where, if in his heart at least, he decided to wage jihad.  Even in his jihad calls however, from what Scahill reports, there was nuance to his criticism. He quotes Thomas Friedman:

. . . the hidden hand of the market cannot survive without the hidden fist. McDonalds’s will never flourish without McDonnell Douglas . . . ” Awlaki continues to describe a “global culture . . . that gives you no choice. Either accept McDonald’s, otherwise McDonnell Douglas will send their F-15s above your head. It is (a) very intolerant culture that cannot coexist with anything else

Awlaki defines Islam, as the only force to take on the “global culture” Awaki’s pitch was that if only Muslims could take over all would be right. While he condemned Christians and Jews even here he was particular:

The important lesson to learn here is never, ever, trust a kuffar (a non-Muslim” . . . Now you might say . . . my coworkers are fabulous people . . . but brothers . . . this person that you know is not the one calling the shots . . . when the Quran talks about the ‘nonbelievers’, it talks about their leaders . . . those who are pulling the strings.

First, that Friedman quote is the most truthful, insightful thing that man has ever said. It does not excuse the enormous amount of crap he has written, but that line is as good as any linking imperialism (i.e. US foreign policy) and capitalism. Absolutely, capitalism needs an army to back it up; there are no US foreign policy entanglements which do not have a corporate component.  As somebody who really believes in equality, in people and religions, I do not believe Christianity is to “blame” for capitalism any more than I “blame” Islam for terrorism. I think that power can corrupt Muslims as well as Christians and you don’t have to look far to see this.

But, no questions there is truth here, substitute “US corporate interests” for “global culture” and there you go. And I find it fascinating that he took the time that, even when discussing the godless heathens (non-Muslims), he took the time to note it was about the power. In spite of his success Awalki returns to Yemen to be with his family.

Reading these passages make me think, again, back to that time post 9-11 and how different things could have been. At the time, I was fairly full of myself, but have to ask what did people do to reach out to American Muslims at that time? I of course did nothing special and I remember stories here and there but was there any serious, political overtures? Maybe there were and I missed them, maybe they would not have been welcomed anyway. It is really a failure of the West, that is supposedly all-inclusive and enlightened that any major group should be so removed from society they would feel called to wage war.

Dirty Wars chapters 10 and 11, Somalia and Yemen

Chapter 10 details the US involvement in Somalia after 9/11, specifically late in 2002 when the US government officially threw themselves with the worst of the warlords that were running the country in lieu of a nearly non-existent central government. There is a little background to the beginning of US involvement with Somalia under Clinton.

The story of our involvement reads like any other US intervention, only the names and places change the practice is the same.  So, on one hand you have intelligence officers, CIA, military etc. talking up the idea that East African was becoming a haven for terrorists. On the other hand you have Somalia experts, i.e. academics, people who had spent their lives studying the country, questioning this narrative. Yes, maybe you had some AQ people running to Somalia from other places but there did not appear any kind of underlying support for radical Islam. You did have country that over the past 10 (now 20) years ravaged by war and a population (guessing here) mainly concerned with survival.

In theory you had a choice here, you could pay a major warlord to do your work.  This would be taking the risk that said warlord, now flush with unlimited cash and weapons support, might just take it upon themselves to interpret the “war on terror” in their own way. The other option might be the take that cash and, oh I don’t know, strengthen the central government? Increase safety, access to food and water, and in the process infiltrate the country to carefully weed out the terrorists that were never part of the community anyway. While the second option sounds more labor-intensive it would not have to be “nation-building”. The biggest issue with Somalia has always been safety; I’m thinking that plenty of international groups would do most of the heavy lifting if a skeletal military force were there and people were not worried about being killed-if the CIA was going to be all over anyway couldn’t they help out with this as well?

Needless to say the first option was exercised, and the warlords quickly engaged in the game of let’s grab anybody remotely Islamic or who we don’t like, and see if the Americans will give us a check. This, in addition to general destabilizing activities, made a bad situation worse. But, they hate us for our FREEDOM. The fact is you will get AQ recruits much faster in a destabilized, poor, under-attack community.  An interesting note in this chapter was a description of how, under Clinton, members of Islamic Jihad, including Ayman al Zawahiri (Bin Laden’s number two), were sent to Egypt through “extraordinary rendition” and tortured. Not long after al Zawahiri published a letter in a British paper vowing revenge against America in “a language they will understand.” Days later the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were carried out, killing 224 people (12 Americans).

It has to be asked, what if these guys were arrested, and put on trial? A public trial, with redactions, closed parts as necessary, but relatively open, so that the world could see were serious about our principles? Now I don’t have any illusions that such a case would be easy, nor do I have a good answer to what is an appropriate punishment for terrorists, and I do not think your committed AQ member can be easily rehabilitated if at all. But you have to wonder how that might “shake up the field” so to speak. If the US walked the walk when it came to bringing suspects to justice what kind of effect would that have on AQ recruits, and their support networks? I think trials need to be done on moral grounds but there are real, practical reasons to do them. Tragically I do not think these ideas ever enter the minds of those in Washington.

Chapter 11 Yemen

Chapter 11 describes the period in Yemen 2003-2006, beginning after the major terror attack in Saudi Arabia, which included the US defense contractor, the Vinnell Corporation. After the ensuing crackdown most AQ members fled to Yemen.

During this period the US took its eye off of Yemen, satisfied that the Saleh had arrested many key AQ figures, and the most elite hunter-killer forces of JOSC were in Iraq. But in 2004 there was a major uprising of the Houthi minority in the north, and Saleh utilized all he had to put in down, which included massive Saudi help as well as easing off AQ to put down the insurgency.

Saleh also used AQ suspects and members as leverage against the US, refusing to hand over suspects, prosecuting and sentenced in Yemen. Hundreds of Yemeni suspects would ultimately be released back into Yemen, essentially allowed to do what they wanted as long as it was not in Yemen. So really, this was period for AQ to gather strength, which I believe is still the case today.

As it has been for a while, Yemen is complex place. But, again, playing the “what if” game you have to wonder if military involvement has stopped at Afghanistan, and there could have been a proper focus on Yemen and Somalia. Now, you certainly could argue that countries are better off when the US ignores them but in both of these cases the US ‘s only interest in these areas would be getting the terrorists out. In theory the US could, especially in the case Yemen, put pressure on through Saudi Arabia to get the terrorists out and possible help broker something of a peace agreement between the various groups. Yes, I know, there is not really any history of the US playing such a role in any conflict-that is usually the US pushes its agenda and tells everybody else to go fuck themselves. But I strongly believe you have to imagine what you want to see to make it happen, or even to try limit bad alternatives.

What if instead of looking inward after 9/11 the US had looked outward-tried to really mediate some of the conflicts that helped perpetuate the terrorists strength? What if the US had tried to demonstrate of the values of the constitution instead of tossing in the garbage? What if?

Dirty Wars chapters 8 and 9-the US Officially Embraces Torture, Stanley McChrystal

Chapter 8 begins describing another bureaucratic battle-this between the FBI and the CIA. Generally, the FBI favored interrogation tactics that were not torture, but parts of the CIA did, goaded on by the Pentagon. It’s important to note not all of the CIA embraced “enhanced interrogation”but generally those people were isolated (or even isolated themselves) or were not promoted. But even with the CIA moving in his direction that wasn’t enough for Rumsfeld, so he looked to programs in the DoD that he thought would be helpful.

These programs included the JSOC, the JPRA, and the SERE. The JSOC was previously introduced, the JPRA is the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. This group was responsible for rescuing military personnel trapped in enemy territory, especially in “denied areas” which knowledge of their presence could cause a lot of problems. JPRA also prepared military personnel for capture by the enemy, this was the SERE program Survival, Evacuation, Resistance, and Escape. The SERE program kept a huge record of torture techniques, going back to the Civil War, and exposed military servicemen to these techniques. Rumsfeld’s idea? To officially use these techniques-“terrorists”remember this is stuff that the worst dictators we know used, that we know at least occasionally killed people-on. I think it’s important to put “terrorists” in quotes. I don’t question that there are people out there that want to do harm to the US, and that maybe it’s appropriate to do large sweeps in suspected areas, maybe it’s ok to take whatever the Pakistan government hands you. A lot of suspects were picked up this way, and I think its reasonable to assume many innocent people, or at least people who were not really that involved and not worth picking up, were taken this way. If you have been paying attention at all to the news at this time (2002-2003) and this chapter makes clear it was obvious that torture techniques were used indiscriminately. That is, if you were unlucky to get picked up, you were put through the mill.

Even if you think torture can be justified-I believe most people would identify torture as not an American value-there is plenty of evidence that torture DOES NOT WORK. Who says it doesn’t work? Is it pointy-headed liberals? Is it those dirty hippy peace activists types? Is it those who are “soft” on terrorism? No, it is veteran interrogators at the FBI, at the CIA. Did they state this clearly and unequivocally to the White House? Yes, yes, did. Did the White House show any sign they took the view of the professional seriously on this matter? No, they did not. They crafted a “torture” memo that basically said if you didn’t kill the person, it was not torture. See, legal! Fixed it for ya as the kids like to say. Congress was “briefed”-even if they were not fully informed I think its clear they didn’t ask any questions, so later they had some wriggle room to claim they didn’t know, in the off chance somebody cared.

I’m not going to describe the torture, which Scahill gives a general description of. All I want to say, if you treat somebody like an animal , you should not be surprised when they, or their family, act like one.

The rest of the chapter discusses the “gray” area of governance for military and intelligence operations. “Covert” operations require permission you might say, “clandestine” operations do not, if said operations are in countries with “anticipated hostilities”. In addition there was conflicting Congressional oversight. R and C of course, saw the whole world as their battlefield, so they used JSOC, which was kind of in-between anyway, and basically did whatever they wanted. But it wasn’t just the CIA and Congress that R and C wanted free of, it was military oversight as well. In essence R and C wanted to have a Special Ops to report directly to them, and to start killing many people right away. As before, there were plenty of military commanders who thought, um, maybe we ought to wait on some intelligence that seems useful, and then go kill lots of people. This was not enough for Rumsfeld, who as always as quick to dismiss anybody who did not agree with him, if you didn’t agree you were gone.  

R and C continued to push for independence, and aggressiveness of action. JSOC was “freed” from military oversight, and began working with an intelligence group known as Gray Fox. Even as Brent Scowcroft (chair of a 2002 commission, former Bush senior official), recommended pushing  more intelligence unit into the CIA, Rumsfeld went the other way.

In April 2002 Project Icon was established, funded by diverting Pentagon funds (not briefed to Congress), later known as Strategic Support Branch or SSB. This group was made up of teams of Special Ops units paired with intelligence personal. Gray Fox and SSB together were in essence R and C’s own army, with Stephen Cambone their main guy. Cambone would be further promoted in 2003 to a position that previously did not exist- undersecretary of defense for intelligence. Again, plenty of professionals in the CIA and military did not think this was a good idea, State department officials noticed a lot of people out of place- R and C did not think they needed to inform ambassadors and the like that operatives were in their cities. As one official says “We know the Geneva Convention was thrown under the bus, so to say, pretty early”. Some officials tried to stay away from it.

Chapter 9 Stanley McChrystal

Chapter 9 is a short bio of McCrystal. He is described as a good solider, a smart one, but also one who knows where the power lies. Actually, the overall description reads like the fawning over General Patraeus. McCrystal is a “warrior scholar” but can relate to his men. He comes off a smart and tough but there is nothing to suggest he possesses any remarkable skills.

The chapter runs through the early part of Iraq War, briefly describing the “leadership” of Bremer, the early, destabilizing decisions of “de-Baathification” and disbanding the Iraq military. “De-Baathification” left out the people most likely to lead the country—it was practically a requirement to join the Baath party if you were to get anywhere professionally. Disbanding the military put thousands of Iraqis out of job and pension-not to mention these were people who might know how to conduct armed resistance?

May 1^st-the famed “Mission Accomplished” speech, and a few months later the guerilla insurgency started. Of course the White house tried to claim this was not happening but you can only deny reality for so long. On August 19^th, the UN was bombed and most UN personal were gone by the time the UN was bombed a second time Sept 2003.

That same month McChrystal became JSOC commander and was charged with crushing the insurgency. Although Rumsfeld had grand plans for JSOC it became all consumed by fighting terrorism in a “nation that had no AQ presence before US tanks rolled in a year earlier.” The chapter discusses Zarqawi, the infamous deck of playing cards, and the development of JSOC’s High Value Targeting task force (HVT).   The chapter introduces William Raven, McChrystal’s right hand man, who ultimately would sustain a major injury and work to vet High Value Targets for JSOC to kill. The chapter ends noting the huge increase in the manhunt list, and “credits” the “improvement” in JSOC to Raven, McChrystal, and Mike Flynn (Flynn was an experienced commander in Afghanistan McChrystal worked with for a short time.)

Dirty Wars Chapter Seven, the Build Up to the Iraq War

Chapter 7 goes into some parts of the GBWA’s prep for the Iraq war, specifically the use and manipulating intelligence, and R and C’s (Rumsfeld and Cheney) efforts to promote the Pentagon over the CIA. Unlike the R and C, the CIA did not have a particular goal to invade or destroy anybody. As most people who were paying attention at the time will know, the “proof” of ties between OBL and Iraq was essentially fabricated. R and C and their understudies such as Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz, just picked out and strung together random details from CIA raw data.  The amount of executive pressure put on the CIA, generally by senior officials and personally by Cheney was completely unprecedented, as were the intelligence reports Feith gave to the president behind Tenet’s back. After intense, unrelenting, pressure, the CIA eventually produced reports the administration could use.

I read this chapter a few months after the 10-year anniversary of the Iraq war, in the midst of an Iraq that seems as unstable and violent as ever. During the anniversary period a lot of the left a lot of energy seemed to be spent on who was right and who was wrong-and aggressively reminding those who were wrong, that they WERE WRONG. At some point, it just seemed really mean and counter-productive. I understand some of the journalists, such as Scahill himself, have been intimately involved with people’s lives that have been irrevocably harmed by the war and its aftermath. I understand that as journalists, you take the role seriously of what the media does, and that had media gone the other way maybe things would have been different. I guess if your happy beating up Ezra Klein for statements he wrote in college, Jeremy, I guess you’ve earned it. But to me, excessive energy spent on calling out journalists who were wrong on Iraq gives the appearance that everybody who was for the war deserves to be blamed equally.

What seemed to me to be lacking—and I am sure I missed things—was more analysis of, if the war couldn’t have been stopped, at least to make people pay for what they had done. To make every effort that it not happen again. Because let’s be real here, Ezra Klein, Dan Savage, even Christopher Hichens do not bear ultimate responsibility for the Iraq War. The people whose fault it is that we went to war against Iraq were the people who wanted it, who always wanted it. Who had a fundamental view that US resources and lives should be expended in the name of word domination-because really that was the goal of Rumsfeld and Cheney.  The people who helped them, some whose names we know well, Condolezza Rice, Feith, Wolfowitz, and some who names we do not know. The Congressional members who voted for the war, Joe Biden and Hilary Clinton among them. These are the people who should be shunned and shamed. We should never forget there was no justifiable reason for the Iraq war; it caused countless deaths, Iraqi and American. We will all be paying for it, literally and figuratively, for the rest of our lives.

Ideally, in a world where people have to bear the consequences of their decisions Rumsfeld and Cheney should not be able to get any kind of job, and every Congress member who voted for the war should have been voted out of office. This of course not only did not happen, but most of the principles have either sailed through the typical trajectory of post-government official life and/or simply carried on in their positions. Joe Biden and Hilary Clinton of course have done especially well. This is really the question to ask, why, when their records and erroneous, dangerous behaviors are so well known, how can Rumsfeld write a book, be interviewed, and treated like a human. Why can Condolezza Rice get a position at an esteemed university-be considered a presidential candidate- after her obvious support and complicity for the destruction of a country and so many lives.  To my knowledge, no regret has been expressed with the decisions by any the Bush administration who actively pushed for war. Ironically, it would seem on the Republican side only the former president has suffered in the PR department, although that is probably as much to do with the financial meltdown as the war.

On the Democratic side it was not much better. On one hand I absolutely believe Hilary Clinton’s support for the war lost her the Democratic nomination for president in 2008. It alienated her from a key part of the activist base, and pushed many of them, especially women who otherwise wouldn’t have dreamed of voting for anybody else, to look elsewhere. I believe Clinton’s choice was a cold, political one. She could have stood against the war, it would have transformed her to a leader of the anti-war movement, put her on track to challenge Bush in 2004—all would have been forgiven, at least for a while. THAT, not a Matt Yglesias post, could have stopped the war. If this sounds like hyperbole remember back to the excitement of the Howard Dean campaign-almost entirely based on his Iraq anti-war position which was an after thought. (He got into the race to talk about health care.)  I have to think had one of the most well-known politicians in the country come out against it-if the former president had joined her?-something really could have happened.  

Of course it didn’t happen, and was probably not ever in the realm of possibility. It’s possible Clinton really thought invading Iraq was legitimate, but more likely she thought it was a way to be “serious”, that is get greater access to power.  The idea that there could be power in rallying masses against the war as opposed to being able to sit at the cool kids table, (to be respectable in important circles) I’m guessing never even entered her mind. More importantly, probably not even something she was interested in, as in terms of action she has never deviated from a neoliberal agenda. Either way, whether it was true belief or political calculation, she was dead to me after that and I think it left enough of a sour taste in some Democratic voters mouths to look at Obama more seriously.

Looking back on the post-Iraq war period I believe the lack of political consequences played a large role in where we are today, although I certainly didn’t think about it this way at the time. Part of the problem was that the anti-war apparatus was I think somewhat spilt between those who were not politically inclined/active (that is more focused on resistance and protest) and the part that was politically active was basically an arm of the Democratic Party. The same Democratic Party whose leaders, (not everybody) had supported the war.  The few anti-war signs of political life, Howard Dean, Dennis Kucinich, rose and fell with their candidate’s political campaign. Dean returned to the conventional politician that he was, and Kucinich did not appear to have skills or the interest in trying to lead a movement.

I wonder what would have been different if there had been a mass-based anti-war party, one politically orientated but expressly focused on anti-war positions of candidates. Such a group could have threatened the Democratic base in key elections, it might have caused some movement. If nothing else maybe a genuine anti-war candidate could have emerged in 2004. Building such an organization is difficult, requiring time, money, and organization. Even if people had been thinking this way, I admit it’s a long shot to seeing to happen.  It’s true that 3^rd parties in general have a poor record of “success”, that is if you define success in terms of getting elected. But you can have an effect by not getting elected, see the Tea Party who have managed to have strong effects on Republican positions by just the threat of a primary. What if similar pressure could be put on Democrats? It’s important to note that while Occupy tends to get compared to the Tea Party they are very different. While parts of the Tea Party could be considered “grassroots” it had solid financial backing, from right-wing sources. Occupy on the other hand was a true organic movement with no such financial resources, and was broken-up in large part through state police intervention.  If enough people stayed home, if even one or two established figures went down or were seriously challenged, could that have changed anything?

Of course part of the reason why the war happened was due to the after effects of 9-11, the manipulation of fear by those who did want to go to war. What is it about our culture that killing people is considered “brave” and choosing to not to kill people is considered “weak”? The few public figures, even just celebrities, who dared to speak out, were ridiculed/shunned. Here is probably where the media can be legitimately blamed; contributing to a culture that seems to think the US is simply a force for good in the world, that if the government says its true, well most of it must be true. Part of the anti-war crowd’s problem was that the majority of the population, speaking generally, does not want to believe the government would flat-out lie to its population, actually put it’s people in risk, for imperial power. In spite of people’s overall skepticism toward government, I feel when push comes to shove, especially national security, most people want to believe what they are told.

Getting back to blame for the war there is another group of people; those who were not for it, but arguably did not do enough to stop it. You could put some Congressional members in this category, if you were feeling generous but I am thinking primarily of members of the GBWA who were against the war, as well as professionals at the CIA. Colin Powell and most of the State department appeared to be against the war, but ultimately supported it. What if Powell had refused to “sign-off” on the war?  What if he had just make his case public, say supported Joe Wilson and Valerie Plame. Certainly, he was one of the most popular members of the administration and it would have been difficult for R and C to isolate him politically in a public way as they had done privately. But I recognize that such a scenario would be just as likely as the Hilary Clinton scenario I sketched out, but for slightly different reasons. Somebody like Colin Powell has spent his entire life following orders and to not follow orders, even when in a theoretically a position of power, would be out of character. Again, it would have meant not sitting at the cool kids table, i.e. invitations to the Council on Foreign Relations and the like, probably no corporate speaking gigs. It would have put one with the dirty, hippy anti-war people, even though that included a lot former Bush senior officials. It seems crazy that culture should be such a powerful pull over what is morally right, but there it is.

Finally, what about the professionals at the CIA who ultimately supported, against their will you might say, the Iraq war? What should we expect of such people? Do we put the same level of responsibility on them as those higher up the food chain? There is line of reasoning that says any involvement in a crime makes you as guilty as the perpetrator. While CIA analyst sounds like an exotic job, ultimately it is a job. I imagine that many of those people have families, mortgages, and I would guess that many of them had been there long enough that they didn’t think leaving/or getting “fired” for protesting the war was a good career move. We all like to think we’d do the right thing when circumstances present us with a serious, moral, choice. I’d like to think I’d do the right thing if I was a worker bee in the CIA, I’d like to think I’d leave and/or protest the war, as forcefully as I did in real life, but I don’t know for sure.

Dirty Wars chapters 4, 5, 6, introducing Yemen, Awlkaki continued, the first assassination

Chapter four introduces the reader to Yemen, and its leader since 1990, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh has managed to stay in power for so long in part because he’s a badass, and because he ok with Yemenese engaging in terrorist activity. In fact the US actively encouraged everybody in the region to fight the mujahedeen so they weren’t really terrorists right, because they were working for us. (#sarcasm)

This was ok until the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 which both inspired a large AQ signup and forced the US to take a closer look at Yemen.  When the FBI went to try to investigate they faced a very hostile environment, but there was a lack of interest in the case in the Clinton White House, and this did not change under Bush.

Again, one has to wonder if either administration had taken the investigation seriously-Yemen was on the radar but not in a big way-could have 9-11 been prevented? If the “war on terror had been declared in 2000 in instead of 2001, would things be different?

Saleh knew he was in a dangerous position after 9-11 and he did exactly what a smart tough guy does in that situation-go kiss the Don’s ring.  He went to the Bush White House, said the things they wanted to hear, left with a ton of money, plus funding from the IMF and the World Bank. He was expected to do something for this of course, first he was to try to get some AQ suspects-an initial attempt in Marib Province does not go well.  Most importantly he allows the US to set up a “counterterrorism camp”—i.e. allow the US to operate independently in Yemen, including the use of drones.

Chapter five continues Awlaki’s story, now in the UK.  His father convinces him to try to finish his Ph.D in the US. So Awlaki goes back, is pulled out by INS,  there had been active work while he was gone to get him if he came back, but then let go. The focus of the chapter then switches to idea that Awlaki was actually a FBI double agent. Scahill presents some compelling evidence for this, it is really fascinating and if it’s been reported on previously I completely missed it.

Chapter six describes in detail the first American to be killed by a drone attack, in Yemen, Ahmed Hijazi. The focus of the attack was Abu Ali al Harithi. Hijazi would later be connected to the “Lackawanna Six”, a supposed sleeper cell in Buffalo.  This targeted assassination of a US citizen, not on the battlefield upset human rights and civil liberties’ organization. It also upset Saleh as well as members of the CIA, concerned that this was the new policy. The Bush administration response was this was a new kind of war. Deal with it. 

Dirty Wars: chapter 3, special ops

Chapter three focuses on JSOC, Joint Special Operations Command. This group was the “covert ops” initially developed out of the failed rescue attempt of Iranian hostages. JSOC was involved with various Latin American operations; under Clinton it was authorized to do work on US soil, which circumvented the Posse Comitatus Act (prohibits the military from domestic law enforcement). This included the Branch Davidian raid and the 1996 Summer Olympics. They were group in charge of the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia. After that, the Clinton administration seemed to have lost all appetite for covert missions. On paper JSOC was involved in many projects but in reality nothing ever moved.

Post 9-11 Cheney and Rumsfeld needed their own paramilitary force to conduct operations-they did not want to work with the CIA, where they felt they would not have sufficient control. Basically Cheney and Rumsfeld did not want anybody to tell them anything. Really, for a bunch of guys with no actually military experience, the hubris that these guys demonstrate is really mind blowing it just as bad as you thought. Ironically, the main people in the State department who wanted a much more restricted response overall, did.

While I firmly believe the best way to stop terrorism is better foreign policy, there is a question to be asked here. If there are terrorists out there that want to kill us, and if we are going to limit formal military involvement-i.e. not invade every country, is there a role for something likes the JSOC (and drones for that matter but I haven’t got to that in the book yet)? If there is what would it look like? From Scahill’s description it would seem our use of special ops went from 1 to 10 in about a minute. Not only did usage or at least plans for usage (haven’t got to what they actually do yet post 9-11) ramp up exponentially, but so did scope, and it would appear that oversight went in the opposite direction, from 10 to 1.

In lieu of grand reversals of foreign policy that may never happen, what is the role in a democracy for something like special ops? I would like say not at all, but honestly I think that is either unrealistic or possibly unsafe (or maybe both.) How many people need to know-does it really compromise security to have (some) members of Congress know everything? Is it possible to allow isolated, “surgical” procedures, which have oversight and are functional-that don’t harm innocent people?  Or is this just not possible and every effort needs to be made to shut the whole thing down? This “surgical” role is what was envisioned by Clinton’s people prior to the Black Hawk Down incident.  Although it would seem that it was endless supervision that limited JSOC in the Clinton administration, really it seems more they were choosing to do that, so concerned of the aftermath of the Black Hawk Down incident. I have to think if they had the will they would have found a way. Cheney and Rumsfeld go 180 degrees in the opposite direction, no consideration for possible consequences or “blowback” (it’s not even clear they understood 9-11 as blowback, which many people would call it ). They just wanted to fight everybody.

It’s obviously an exercise in what if, but you have to wonder how things might have played out if the State department had been allowed to lead. I’m no Powell fan but compared to Cheney and Rumsfeld he practically comes off as a peacenik. If say there had been a genuine fight between the two what could have happened? As it was it would seem Rumsfeld completely outmaneuvered Powell, but you could argue that it wasn’t a fair fight as Rumsfeld had Cheney in his corner and Cheney had power that couldn’t really be touched. Is it even conceivable that GW Bush could have intervened and told Cheney and Rumsfeld to cut it out? I feel it’s worth noting that many, if not everybody from his father’s administration who was not in his, was against the Iraq war. He could have taken control I think if (and it’s a big if) if wanted to. Whether he really thought like Cheney and Rumsfeld, or whether he just did not fully grasp their plans and the potential consequences, I’m not sure we will ever know.

In his book “Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, Ahmed Rashid, almost gives the impression had Bush been left to his own devices things might had been different.  But the rhetoric was divorced from reality, maybe on purpose maybe not. He really blames Rumsfeld (with Cheney’s support) for making all of the worst decisions in Afghanistan and squandering the precious good will that the US had early on. Ahmed Rashid was at least initially supportive of US involvement in Afghanistan because he though getting the Taliban out was so important. Like a lot of people he would become disillusioned when it was clear that the US’s interests in Afghanistan were not really about helping the country, but just doing the bare minimum. 

Blogging Dirty Wars, chapter two. Anwar Awlaki, 9-11, and "religious violence"

Chapter two introduces Anwar Awlaki-the first US citizen known to be targeted for assassination by the US government. Awalki was born in the US but his parents were from Yemen. His father came to the US for education and then returned to Yemen. It was his hope that Awlaki would follow in his (academic) footsteps. He did initially but became an imam, and was very popular. Taken what is publically known of his time in the US (the chapter ends with him leaving the US for Britain in 2002) there were certainly some coincidences, but nothing that definitively links him to terrorist activities.

The parts of this chapter which resonated most with me was the description of time immediately post 9-11, and how that period played out if you were Muslim. Also, what you might call the “middle class” immigrant experience. That is, people who have the means and resources to come to a more developed country for education and even to stay. For these people, who have a real choice ,there is pull between opportunities that the more developed country presents, versus the unique aspects of home. Awlaki’s father had come to the US to study, and then returned to Yemen to teach, it was his hope and expectation that his son would do the same. One the people I follow on twitter is Haykal Bafana, Yemeni national who grew up in Singapore.  It was his father’s hope that he would live in Singapore, but he ultimately (at least as of this writing) came back to Yemen. He described this in some tweets, noting that as frustrating as Yemen was, he felt called to be there. Although my own circumstances are quite different, I understand the sentiment completely. I have issues with my city and state and even country regarding any number of issues, however I’m not worried about being killed by bombs or drones. As a fortune-teller tells the character Tex (in the book and the movie) “Some will stay, some will go. You will stay.” I always thought I would go, at least out of state, but it turns out I am one who stays.

As to the time post 9-11 I remember that time personally as a time when I felt very disconnected from my culture. I felt sadness at the attacks, but not fear, I think in part because I knew quite well that they did not attack us for our “freedoms”.

I take concepts of liberty and freedom for all very seriously, so if these principles are not distributed in an equitable fashion, I do not consider that fair. I think it is this what has led me to have a somewhat adversarial relationship with my country (and my religion as well). It is also why I felt a modicum of sympathy towards people who felt they had just had enough of American foreign policy. No, of course none of the people who died in the 9-11 attacks “deserved it” but neither did the many people, in Central America among other places, that had been killed either by US forces or with full US support in the name of “freedom”. How many people have been killed by my government, in my name essentially, and if I was killed in a terrorist attack would that only be fair? No, I am not in the military but neither are the many civilians killed by drone attacks. I didn’t support these killings but since my government did am I not fair game?

The US government claimed they hated us for our “freedom”, and it was clear at least some of the country believed that, which I found so depressing. Did people really not know any history, or was it ok that the US killed people, because the US is always right, by definition. To this day, I am not sure. I recognize it is probably a little of both, although I have always clung to ignorance. However as I watch “liberals” who were so quick to criticism GWB for the same things that Obama is doing, I have to admit to myself that may not be the case.

Reading Awlaki’s and other imam’s reactions to the attacks is heart wrenching. Needless to say, none of them were prepared for such an attack and how it would impact them and their followers’ lives. As described in the book Muslim women, easily identified by their headscarfs, required escorts for safety. I have since heard of all kinds of experiences of Muslim women being harassed, attacked, in front of their children.  It makes me really sad-what kind of person harasses women and children-is that really what “America” is about? How can you claim to be about “freedom”? All major religions have had periods of time in history where they were the “other”-if it wasn’t right then why is it ok now?

I remember, locally, that immediately after the attacks that it was Japanese organization that officially came out to support Muslims. This makes perfect sense, since this was only group that could really relate to the situation. Only Japanese Americans have been accused and punished-as a group-for something they had nothing to do with, because they were easily identifiable.

I had at that point not thought very much about Muslims in this country, or Islam, and have only learned in the intervening years just how difficult that time was. My tendency is to assume that most people think like I do-most large, mainstream, organized religions are more alike then similar. They generally preach the same thing, which generally runs in line with humanist principles. Obviously, there are differences, especially in social issues and there are large cultural influences. But I could never buy the idea that Islam is a “violent religion”. Yes there are some violent Muslims, there are violent Christians too (KKK anybody?) Just as there are many Christian groups I do not want to be associated with, I can easily imagine that most Muslim are not terrorists or are supportive of them.

People who claim Islam is “violent”-particularly odd coming from the new “atheists” crowd are either ignorant of history or have some odd ideas of what constitutes “violence”.  Just to name a few, the killings inherent in the crusades, the years of religious strife in Europe in the medieval period and post-reformation, WWI and WWII by Christians. Current and recent repression by Buddhists in Myanmar and Sri Lanka of Muslims and the Tamils. Recent violence against Muslims by Hindu extremists. There is also, rarely mentioned, the broader issue of institutional violence that occurs from corporate hegemony pushed by the West (i.e. Christian majority nations) that is only resisted by relatively small groups of Christians.

By the same token, I do not think any religion makes people more violent. Whenever you get groups of people with disagreements-usually to some degree over resource allocation-you get conflict. It may manifest itself as an ethnic or religious conflict but 99% of the time the fight is really over something else quite tangible. I remember a discussion with my mother regarding the institution of the (Catholic) Church. At some point, somewhat frustrated over my frustration with the institution she said to me “God is God. But God works though people, and people are fallible”.

And that I think sums up the conflicts that we are involved with-they start and end with the inherent fallibility of humans themselves.

blogging Dirty Wars chapter one

I'm going to try to blog through the entire book because I think it is really important to try to grasp what is happening, how, why, and what if anything, can be done about it. Note it's a long book and there will be plenty of unrelated posts in between.

Chapter one is kind of brief overview of where we where, in term of covert activity and combatting terrorism right at 9-11. For me, it confirmed a lot of what my impressions were at the time, for the most part what things I didn't know do not come as much of a surprise. That is, the team of Cheney and Rumsfeld had some very specific, radical ideas for policies that they were starting to put into place prior to 9-11, post 9-11 there was nothing to hold them back. They had hoped to do this when working for Bush the elder, but were squashed, so they spent the intervening years planning for it.  Basically they wanted the US to dominate on a global, forceful, scale, accountable to no one. Also, they were from the beginning obsessed with Iraq.

They managed to find a kindred spirit in Cofer Black of the CIA. One of the interesting notes is how the CIA, generally and George Tenet specifically, were not actually that into the idea of extra-judicial killings. There had been some under Clinton, but had substantial oversight. Tenet would later (publicly anyway) support the Iraq war and write a really self-serving book. During the promotional tour he made an appearance on Fresh Air that came awfully close to mansplaining. So it's kind of interesting to see him, at the beginning anyway, presented as somebody with some morals.

For all of Cheney's and Rumfeld's dismissal of the Clinton administration it's quite clear in the book, as it seemed at the time, that the Clinton administration was much more on top of AQ. George W. Bush's administration (GWBA)  was just getting around to it (!) when 9-11 happened. In my mind, this issue of the GWBA simply dropping the ball never got enough play.  Forget conspiracy theories-who needs conspiracies when you have incompetence? Because logically it would seem that, if, say, the policies of Clinton had been continued, it's quite possible 9-11 could have been avoided. What if Al Gore would have been elected? This is such an important point because all of the draconian policies that went into play after 9-11 (although Scahill makes clear Cheney and Rumsfeld were headed this direction already) were sold to the public as necessary, and it's quite probable they weren't.

The main question I have starting the book is of course, how can this be changed? Is the increased power of the executive branch inevitable? It was practically stopped in the 70s with the Church committee and Cheney and Rumsfeld worked very hard to undue all the preventative measures put in place by the committee. After the wars and over 10 years post 9-11 people are asking questions--many people supportive of Obama are supportive because they think he really he going to change these policies, at some point.