Chapter three focuses on JSOC, Joint Special Operations
Command. This group was the “covert
ops” initially developed out of the failed rescue attempt of Iranian hostages.
JSOC was involved with various Latin American operations; under Clinton it was
authorized to do work on US soil, which circumvented the Posse Comitatus Act
(prohibits the military from domestic law enforcement). This included the
Branch Davidian raid and the 1996 Summer Olympics. They were group in charge of
the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia. After that, the Clinton
administration seemed to have lost all appetite for covert missions. On paper
JSOC was involved in many projects but in reality nothing ever moved.
Post 9-11 Cheney and Rumsfeld needed their own paramilitary
force to conduct operations-they did not want to work with the CIA, where they
felt they would not have sufficient control. Basically Cheney and Rumsfeld did
not want anybody to tell them anything. Really, for a bunch of guys with no
actually military experience, the hubris that these guys demonstrate is really mind
blowing it just as bad as you thought. Ironically, the main people in the State
department who wanted a much more restricted response overall, did.
While I firmly believe the best way to stop terrorism is
better foreign policy, there is a question to be asked here. If there are
terrorists out there that want to kill us, and if we are going to limit formal
military involvement-i.e. not invade every country, is there a role for
something likes the JSOC (and drones for that matter but I haven’t got to that
in the book yet)? If there is what would it look like? From Scahill’s
description it would seem our use of special ops went from 1 to 10 in about a
minute. Not only did usage or at least plans for usage (haven’t got to what
they actually do yet post 9-11) ramp up exponentially, but so did scope, and it
would appear that oversight went in the opposite
direction, from 10 to 1.
In lieu of grand reversals of foreign policy that may never
happen, what is the role in a democracy for something like special ops? I would
like say not at all, but honestly I think that is either unrealistic or
possibly unsafe (or maybe both.) How many people need to know-does it really
compromise security to have (some) members of Congress know everything? Is it
possible to allow isolated, “surgical” procedures, which have oversight and are
functional-that don’t harm innocent people? Or is this just not possible and every effort needs to be
made to shut the whole thing down? This “surgical” role is what was envisioned by
Clinton’s people prior to the Black Hawk Down incident. Although it would seem that it was
endless supervision that limited JSOC in the Clinton administration, really it
seems more they were choosing to do
that, so concerned of the aftermath of the Black Hawk Down incident. I have to think
if they had the will they would have found a way. Cheney and Rumsfeld go 180
degrees in the opposite direction, no consideration for possible consequences
or “blowback” (it’s not even clear they understood 9-11 as blowback, which many
people would call it ). They just wanted to fight everybody.
It’s obviously an exercise in what if, but you have to wonder
how things might have played out if the State department had been allowed to
lead. I’m no Powell fan but compared to Cheney and Rumsfeld he practically
comes off as a peacenik. If say there had been a genuine fight between the two
what could have happened? As it was it would seem Rumsfeld completely outmaneuvered
Powell, but you could argue that it wasn’t a fair fight as Rumsfeld had Cheney
in his corner and Cheney had power that couldn’t really be touched. Is it even
conceivable that GW Bush could have intervened and told Cheney and Rumsfeld to
cut it out? I feel it’s worth noting that many, if not everybody from his
father’s administration who was not in his, was against the Iraq war. He could
have taken control I think if (and it’s a big if) if wanted to. Whether he
really thought like Cheney and Rumsfeld, or whether he just did not fully grasp
their plans and the potential consequences, I’m not sure we will ever know.
In his book “Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster
in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, Ahmed Rashid, almost gives the
impression had Bush been left to his own devices things might had been
different. But the rhetoric was
divorced from reality, maybe on purpose maybe not. He really blames Rumsfeld
(with Cheney’s support) for making all of the worst decisions in Afghanistan
and squandering the precious good will that the US had early on. Ahmed Rashid
was at least initially supportive of US involvement in Afghanistan because he
though getting the Taliban out was so important. Like a lot of people he would
become disillusioned when it was clear that the US’s interests in Afghanistan
were not really about helping the country, but just doing the bare minimum.
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